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POINT ONE
GRAYSTONErS FACT ARGUMENTS SHOULD
ALL BE DISREGARDED AS THEY INTERPRET
FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO GRAYSTONE
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment.

It is

well established that on summary judgment the appellate court
will review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (DeBry).

See e.g., Mountain States, Etc. v. Atkin,

Wrights & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984):
Therefore, under Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, summary judgment can be
granted only if the record shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. . .Doubts, uncertainties, or
inferences, concerning issues of fact must be
construed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. (Emphasis
added.)
See also, Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1984);
Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387.
On virtually every page, Graystone's brief violates
this standard rule.

Graystone always interprets the facts in the

light most favorable to Graystone.

Indeed, Graystone's brief

sounds more like a jury argument than an appellate brief.
Moreover, many of Graystone's fact arguments are not: even
relevant.

Here are several examples:

A.

The 60% Fee.
Graystone argues that DeBry earned the "equivalent of a

60% fee."

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 8.)

proposed a contingent fee of $18,300.

In fact, Graystone

Before the contract was

changed to a contingent fee, DeBry was paid approximately $5,000
on an hourly basis-

(R. 001343.)

Thus, DeBry's total fee on the

case was $23,300. On the surface, that appears to be a handsome
fee.

However, that turns out to be approximately 38% of the

settlement (not 60% as Graystone claims) or approximately $32 per
hour1.
This modest fee can be put in perspective by comparing
defense costs.

Although there is nothing in the record to show

defense costs, the court can take judicial notice of standard
defense costs in the community.

It is likely that the losing

attorneys were paid $75-$125 per hour in the underlying case.
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn. v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

Moreoever, it

is likely that Graystone Pines is paying their present attorneys
$100-$150 per hour.

x

Fifty dollars ($50) per hour for approximately 100 hours
prior to the switch to a contingent fee, and 626 hours
thereafter. See R.001296.
2

B.

Retired Folks.
Graystone's brief is laced with comments regarding the

"retired folks on fixed incomes•"
at p. 11 and 41.

See e.g., Brief of Respondent,

Such comments are not relevant to any issue in

the case, and are a clear attempt to seek sympathy of the court.
However, there is another version of the evidence.

The

president of Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. involved in this
case was a top sales manager for Proctor & Gamble.

Another

former president involved in this case was a high executive with
an oil company and a very wealthy man.

A third former president

of Graystone involved in this case laughed at DeBry's claim for
$50 per hour, because he (Graystone's former president) earned
$100 to $150 per hour.

The members of Graystone Pines

Homeowner's Assn., contrary to respondent's allusions, range from
upper middle class to wealthy.

(See Brief of Appellant, Ex-

hibit E, or R. 001667-001668.)
C.

Punishment or Extortion.
Graystone argues that DeBry's motive was, ". . .either

to punish the homeowners. . .or to extort a higher fee. . .(Brief
of Respondent, at p. 29-30.)
improper.

The raising of that issue is

It was not framed by the pleadings and was never

presented below.
Assuming relevance, a factfinder could conclude that
DeBry's claim was based upon a reasonable desire to be paid more
3

for his work than a plumber would be paid.

Graystone wanted to

pay DeBry about $32 per hour while the losing attorney was paid
$75-$125 per hour.
10:7:
D.

(Compare para. A, above.)

See also, St. Luke

". • .The labourer is worthy of his hire."'

Multiple Defendants.
Graystone made much of the fact that DeBry named

multiple defendants in the proceedings below.
Respondent, at p. 12 & 13.)

(Brief of

Those other defendants were

dismissed by the trial court and no appeal has been pursued.
The basis for joining other parties below was statutory:
The compensation of an attorney and counselor
for his services is governed by agreement,
express or implied, which is not restrained
by law. From the commencement of an action,
or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a
party has a lien upon his client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attaches to a
verdict, report, decision or judgment in his
client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in
whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be
affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment. (Emphasis
added.)
Utah Code Ann. §78-51-41.
The other parties named by DeBry were persons who, in
one way or another, had held the settlement fund.
the statute, they could be named as parties.

According to

However, late in

the case, the court ordered defendant Graystone Pines to hold the
disputed fund in escrow.

(R. 001495-001497.)
4

At that point,

there was sufficient security that DeBry did not need to pursue
the appeal against those third parties.
In summary, there is evidence in the record from which
a jury could conclude that it was reasonable and prudent for
DeBry to join other third parties in the proceedings below.
E.

Multiple Pleadings.
Graystone alleges bad faith.

As support for this

argument, Graystone says there were over 250 pleadings in this
case.
To begin with, this same argument was presented to the
trial court judge.

It is impossible to make any determination of

good faith or bad faith based merely on counting pleadings.
The trial court, being intimately familiar with the substance of
the file, rejected Graystone's argument.
below.)

(See Point Nine,

Now Graystone repeats that argument to an appellate

court which Graystone knows has no familiarity with the substance
of the pleadings.
More importantly, Graystone has failed to advise the
court that over 1/3 of the 250 pleadings relate to Graystone's
malpractice claim against DeBry.

Graystone's malpractice claim

against DeBry was motivated solely for harassment and revenge.
(See Deposition of John Webster, at p. 101 and 163.)
Furthermore, Graystone's malpractice claim of $78,000 was based

5

upon fraudulent evidence.

(See Affidavit of Woodward, at R.

001533 and Exhibit 1 hereto.)
That malpractice claim was eventually settled for a
nuisance value of $3,500.2
"Settlement Agreement.")

(R. 001841-001846; Exhibit 2 hereto,
Although the malpractice settlement was

to be kept confidential, DeBry must refer to that settlement in
order to rebut Graystone's argument about "250" pleadings in the
file.

The fact is that over 1/3 of those pleadings were

generated by Graystone on a separate and probably frivolous
issue.
P.

Settlement Value of the Underlying Case.
Most of Graystone's brief is devoted to complicated

computations which purport to show the settlement value of the
underlying case.

(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 23-29.)

For

example, Graystone says?
1.

There was a 7 5% chance of
recovering somewhere between
$50,000 and $80,000 at trial.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 25.)

2.

The maximum anticipated jury award
at the second trial was $92,954.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 26.)

^The payment of $3,500 was not an admission of fault; but
rather, an economic reality that it would cost more to defend the
claim. Furthermore, the standard malpractice insurance policy
requires a party to accept a reasonable settlement.
6

3.

$75,000 would become the ceiling
for a settlement. (Brief of
Respondent, at p. 27 and 28.)

However, there is another version of the evidence.
1.

There was a reasonable chance of a
jury verdict substantially in
excess of $100,000.

2.

The settlement value of the case
was $90,000 or more.

(Brief of Appellant, at Exhibit E, para. 14.

R. 001668.)

All of Graystone's arguments fail if the jury believes
this latter version of the evidence.
G.

Trial v. Settlement.
Graystone's brief makes a convoluted computation of

DeBry's fee under various scenarios.

Graystone concludes that

DeBry made more money—because the case was settled for $61,000—
than he would have had the case proceeded to trial.

(Brief of

Respondent, at p. 27-29.)
However, those computations are all based upon a false
premise.

Graystone assumed that the homeowners had to grab an

immediate settlement for $61,000 or else go to trial.

(Brief of

Respondents t p. 27-29.)
There is testimony in the record that the homeowners
settled their case approximately one month before trial.
Settlements are always higher a week before trial, or a day
before trial or even during the trial.
7

In fact, in the first

trial, the best offer was made just one day before trial.

There

was a very low probability that there would have ever needed to
be any second trial-

If the parties had continued to negotiate,

during that final month, the case would probably have settled for
$90,000 or more-

A large majority

of all experienced attorneys

would have advised the homeowners to reject the $61,000 offer,
and continue to negotiate during that final month.

(Brief of

Appellant, Exhibit E, at para. 5, 6, 7, and 14; R. 001664001668.)
Also, Graystone's brief forgets that if the case were
settled during that last month, DeBry would not have had to pay
any substitute counselH.

War of Attrition.
Graystone suggests that this is a war of attrition in

which DeBry has the upper hand by using staff attorneys.
of Respondent, p. 30, n. 10.)

(Brief

There is absolutely nothing in

the record to support this assertion.

Furthermore, the relevance

of this assertion is questionable.
In fact, DeBry gets no advantage.

Every hour the DeBry

staff works on this case must be diverted from other feegenerating businessc

It really makes no difference whether DeBry

pays $100 per hour for outside legal service, or whether DeBry
loses $100 in fees to have the same work done in-house-

8

I.

DeBryrs Intent,
DeBry's opening brief argued that the agreement called

for two alternative methods to compute fees-

If Graystone

controlled the settlement negotiations, the fee was to be $50 per
hour; if DeBry controlled the settlement negotiations, the fee
was to be 30%.

(Brief of Appellant, at Points I and II.)

Graystone's brief argues that initially DeBry had no
such intent.

Graystone argues that the alternative fee theory

came many months or years after the formation contract.
of Respondent, at p. 36 and 37.)

(Brief

Graystone's theory is based

upon flimsy circumstantial evidence.

Furthermore, the fact

theory was not presented below.
Contrary to what Graystone says, a factfinder might
conclude that the parties intended exactly what they said:

"I

would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete and
unfettered control over any settlement."

(R. 001006.)

To the extent that intent is an issue in the case,
intent is always a jury issue.

Colonial Leasing Co. of New

England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488;
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714; Morris v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983).
J.

Greed.
Graystone's brief is largely an ad hominem attack on

DeBry.

Graystone paints the picture of a ruthless attorney whose
9

object was to "extort" money from "retired folks."

(Brief of

Respondent, pp. 29-30, 11.)
Clearly, DeBry's reputation is not an issue in the case
and Graystone knows it.
Even assuming relevance, a factfinder could easily
construe the facts in a different light.

At the outset, DeBry

reduced his regular hourly fee from $70 per hour to $50 per hour
as a favor to Graystone.

(R. 000688.)

Later, when DeBry

increased his regular billing rate for other clients to $90 per
hour, DeBry did not raise his rates to Graystone.

(R. 001006.)

Still later, DeBry agreed, at Graystone's urging, to switch over
to a contingent fee even though this case did not lend itself to
such an arrangement.
contingent fee,

Few other attorneys would have accepted a

(R* 000688, 001587.)

DeBry even encouraged

Graystone to shop around for a new attorney.

(R. 000688.)

When a trial date was set, DeBry was even willing to
give up part of his fee rather than delay the case.

(R. 001014.)

(Most lawyers would have simply delayed the case.)
Graystone did not return the same degree of good faith.
In the final trial preparations, Graystone tried to trick the
court as well as its own attorney in order to unfairly increase
the damage award.

(See Point Eight, below.

Woodward, Exhibit 1 hereto.)
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Also, Affidavit of

Although the first trial was lost, DeBry won a
noteworthy victory on the appeal.

Management Committee of

Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. v. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d
896 (Utah 1982) .
When the second trial was still nearly a month away,
the parties began some settlement negotiations.

Graystone

accepted a settlement offer of $61,000 against DeBry's advice.
(R. 001009.)
realities.

This settlement was not based upon economic

Rather, Graystone settled because they didn't want to

go through the stress of a second trial.
001011, 001647; 001315.)

(R. 000688; 001005,

If Graystone had followed DeBry's

advice for another few weeks, the case could have been settled
without a trial for $90,000 or more.

(R. 001665, para. 6;

001688, para. 14.)
In the end, DeBry was only paid about $30 per hour for
his work.

The losing attorney was paid around $75-$100 per hour

for the same case.

(See Point 1(A), above.)

When a lawyer takes

a case on a contingent fee, the lawyer accepts the risk of
losing.

However, the lawyer does not necessarily take the risk

that his client will become overstressed at the thought of a
trial.
When DeBry raised the fee dispute, Graystone promptly
invented a frivolous malpractice action to punish DeBry.

11

That

action was later settled for "nuisance value."

(See Point 1(E),

above.)
POINT TWO
GRAYSTONEffS BRIEF CITES NO
AUTHORITY FOR THE KEY ISSUE IN THIS CASE
DeBry's opening brief argued that the fee agreement was
not an absolute prohibition on the client's power to settle the
case; rather, the agreement merely provided for an alternative
method of computing fees (30% if DeBry controlled the settlement,
and $50 per hour if Graystone controlled the settlement).
DeBry's brief relied upon several authorities including the
leading text on attorney fees-

(See Brief of Appellant, at p. 6

and Exhibit G thereto.)
Graystone's brief does not cite a single case in
opposition to DeBry's theory on alternative fee arrangements.
(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 32-33, 36-37,)
Instead, Graystone argues, at length, that a contract
is void if it restricts a client's right to settle.
those arguments are simply not relevant.

However,

This is not a case

where the client's right to settle is restricted.

Rather, this

is a case where the parties have agreed on an alternate fee if
the client settles without approval of counsel.

12

POINT THREE
THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY EVIL
ABOUT AN ATTORNEY CONTROLLING SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Although the issue is irrelevant (see Point Two,
above), this court should not be left with the impression that
there is something evil about an attorney controlling settlement
negotiations.
Courts have recognized that covenants against
settlement without consent are the result of an understandable
need attorneys have to protect their investment in a case.
v. Harper, 8 Mo.App. 296 (1886); In Re:

Duke

Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82

N.E. 742, 743 (1907) (dissenting opinion).

In some

jurisdictions, such covenants are valid under statutory or case
law.

Goldberg's Loan Office v. Evans, 37 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1934);

Benton v. Dow Chemical Company, 351 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.App. 1961);
Succession of Vlaho, 140 So.2d 226 (La. 1962).
Even those jurisdictions which hold such covenants to
be invalid, recognize that such covenants are not intrinsically
evil.

Davis v. Webber, 49 S.W. 822, 825 (1899), for example,

stated:

13

While the contract sued upon
public policy and, therefore
making of such a contract is
prohibitum nor malum in se.
of questionable propriety.

is against
void, yet the
neither malum
It is not even

Recognizing the dilemma attorneys face when they are
paid on a contingent basis, Arkansas' attorney's lien statute now
provides that if a contingent fee case is settled without the
attorney's consent, the attorney may recover in quantum meruit,
and his fee will not be limited by the settlement amount.

Ark.

Stat. §25-301; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Hurst, 198 Ark.
546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (Ark. 1939).
POINT FOUR
THE COURT SHOULD
NOT INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT
LANGUAGE ON A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Graystone argues that the contract should not be
interpreted to set up an alterative fee as claim€*d by DeBry.
(Brief of Respondent, p. 32-34.)

The specific language to be

interpreted is as follows:
. . .1 would accept the contingent fee only
if I had complete and unfettered control over
any settlement.
If the contingent fee proposed is for any
reason unworkable, I would continue to work
on an hourly basis.
(R. 1006 emphasis from original.)

14

Graystone claims that language should be strictly
construed against DeBry.

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 32-34-)

However, the issue is not how to interpret a contract.

Rather,

the issue is who should interpret the contract.
If the language is unambiguous on its face, the court
will construe the contract.
716 (Utah 1985).

Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,

However, the canon of construction upon which

Graystone relies can only be used as part of an evidentiary
hearing or trial.

Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582,

586, (Ut.App. 1986).
This case was decided on summary judgment, and the
trial court incorrectly determined there was no question of fact.
(R. 1294-1296.)

Therefore, this court should review the case

under a correctness standard without resort to inferences of fact
or canons of construction.

Craig Food Industries v. Weihing, 746

P.2d 279, 283 (Ut.App. 1987).
On the other hand, if there is any ambiguity, the case
cannot be decided on summary judgment.
for further factual development.

The case must be remanded

Wilburn v. Interstate Electric,

supra.
Finally, Graystone's brief cited several cases to
illustrate how other courts have interpreted a fee agreement
which restricts the client's right to settle.
Respondent, at p. 18-22.)

(See Brief of

However, all of Graystone's cases were
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decided after a full trial or an evidentiary hearing.

Therefore,

Graystone's cases are not helpful in analyzing a summary judgment
ruling.
POINT FIVE
REASONABLENESS IS
A JURY ISSUE
Graystone vigorously argues that DeBry's conduct was
unreasonable.

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 23-24.)

Graystone

further argues that it was reasonable for the homeowners to
proceed with their settlement against DeBry's advice.
Respondent, at p. 24-25.)

(Brief of

Finally, Graystone argues that the 30%

contingent fee was reasonable under the circumstances.

(Brief of

Respondent, at p. 25-29.)
The trouble with these arguments is that this is a
summary judgment motion.

There has been no trial and no

evidentiary hearing where the court could develop the factual
basis for a finding of reasonableness.

Indeed, the facts on the

record can easily be construed to show that Graystone did not act
reasonably.

(See Point One, above.)

Reasonableness is usually an issue for the jury to
decide.

C & H Construction and Paving Co., Inc. v. Citizen's

Bank, 597 P.2d 1190, 93 N.M. 150 (N.M.App. 1979).

If this case

is to be decided on the basis of reasonableness—as opposed to

16

the bare language of the contract—the case should be remanded
for a trial.
POINT SIX
GRAYSTONE IGNORES THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A RECITAL AND A COVENANT
Graystone argues that the contract was only intended to
restrict Graystone from pressing for an unwise trial.
Respondent/ p. 32-35.)

(Brief of

That argument relies on one part of the

March 4f 1980 letter which sets forth a reason why DeBry insisted
on complete control over settlement.

DeBry wrote:

Clients are sometimes overly optimistic
because they are not paying anything to their
attorney. Thusf they may turn down
reasonable settlement offers because it costs
them nothing to gamble on the results of the
trial. Therefore/ I would accept a
contingent fee only if I had complete and
unfettered control over any settlement.
(R. 001006.)
The law makes a distinction between a recital in a
contract and a covenant.

Recitals generally describe background

and do not have the force of a contractual stipulation.

In Re:

Taxes f 380 P.2d 156 (Haw. 1963); Hulin v. Veach, 35 P.2d 253 (Or.
1934); 17 AmJur.2d/ "Contracts," §268.

Furthermore, if the

operative part of the contract is not ambiguous, the operative
part controls even if it is inconsistent with the recital.
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Jamison v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 60 Ariz. 308, 136 P.2d
265 (Ariz. 1943); 17 AmJur.2d, "Contracts," §268.
It is true that recitals may be considered to determine
the parties intent.

However, the court will only resort to such

tools of construction when the meaning of the operative language
is unclear.

Rains v. Walby, 537 P.2d 833 (Wash.App. 1975).

However, if the language is unclear, the matter should not be
decided on summary judgment.
This contract was contained within a letter.

But it is

clear that the following language was a recital:
Clients are sometimes overly oprimistic
because they are not paying anything to their
attorney. Thus, they may turn down
reasonable settlement offers becuase it costs
them nothing to gamble on the results of the
trial.
(Re 000148, para. 4.)

The language above merely describes the

background.
It is also clear that the operative language is as
follows:
I would accept the contingent fee only
if I had complete and unfettered control over
any settlement.
If the contingent fee proposal is for
any reason unworkable, I would continue to
work on an hourly basis,
(R. 00014, para. 4 and 5.)
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It is hard to imagine more unambiguous langauge than "complete
and unfettered control."

Such unambiguous language can only

include both decisions to turn down a settlement and decisions to
accept one.

This operative language governs*
POINT SEVEN
GRAYSTONErS BRIEF FAILS
TO DISCUSS THE KEY ISSUE OF SEVERABILITY

The threshold issue in this case is whether the
underlying contract violates public policy.

If the contract does

not offend public policy, it should be enforced.

However, if the

underlying contract does violate public policy, the court is
immediately faced with the doctrine of severability.

In other

words, does the entire contract fall^ or does the invalid portion
(DeBry to control settlement negotiations) fall; while leaving
the valid portion intact (30% fee).
DeBry's theories on severability were supported by In
Re:

Snyder, 82 N.E. 742, 190 N.Y. 66 (1907).

(Exhibit 3.)

This is consistent with general contract law which does not limit
quantum meruit recovery to the amount of contractual compensation.

Corbin on Contracts, §1107, 1109 (1964) Ed.). The only

^If the entire contract falls, the parties revert to quantum
meruit. See Banta v. Banta, 82 N.Y.S. 113; In Re: Snyder, 190
N.Y.66, 82 N.E. 742 (N.Y. App. 1907).
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authority cited by defendants which is directly on point is
Lefkowitz v. Leblanq, 187 N.Y.S. 520 (S.Ct. 1921), decided by a
lesser court than Snyder.

Lefkowitz is also questionable

authority in light of In re;

Montgomery's Estate, 272 N.Y. 323,

6 N.E.2d 40 (1936) which allowed quantum meruit recovery of
attorney fees in excess of the contractual compensation.4

The

other cases cited by defendants were not generally in point
because they involved settlement provisions which were severable
from the remainder of the contract.
POINT EIGHT
GRAYSTONE'S FRAUD IS NOT
SHIELDED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
During the preparations for the underlying trial,
Graystone manufactured fake evidence.

(See Affidavit of Mark

Woodward, R. 001533 and Exhibit 1 hereto.)

This faked evidence

was aimed at the court, the opposing party, and Graystone's
attorney DeBry.

DeBry was tricked by the faked evidence.

(See

Affidavit of Robert J. DeBry, at R. 001539 and Exhibit 4

*In a quantum meruit trial, a jury is still entitled to look
at the contract as one of the factors it weighs in considering
what is reasonable under all the facts and circumstances.
Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 130 F.Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); 57 ALR.2d 13, Section 14. In this case, where there are
two alternative fees, a jury could consider both versions of the
contract in determining what it thought was reasonable.
20

hereto.)

Interestingly/ Graystone does not deny the fraud.

Indeed, there is not even a counter-affidavit in the file.
(Compare Affidavit of Mark Woodard, at R. 001533 and Exhibit 1.)
Rather, Graystone merely seeks to hide its fraud behind the
curtain of the statute of limitations.

(Brief of Respondent, at

p. 42-43.)
It is true that an affirmative claim under the statute
of limitations would be barred.
affirmative claim for fraud.
as a defense.

However, this is not an

Ratherf fraud arises in this case

Specifically, Graystone seeks to pay attorney fees

based upon a 30% contingent fee arrangement.

DeBry defends

against that particular agreement by saying that it was procured
by fraud.

Where fraud is raised as a defense, the statute of

limitations does not apply.

Ackmann v. Merchant's Mtg. & Trust

Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v.
Johnston, 547 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1976); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co.
v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1974).
Graystone also makes much of the fact that the fraud
was not asserted until rather late in the litigation.

However,

as the date on the Woodward affidavit shows (Exhibit 1), DeBry
was not able to locate the witness and obtain the necessary
evidence until rather late in the litigation.^
^Compare Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Finally, Graystone asserts that the only concrete
fraudulent representation occurred in August of 1980.
Respondent, at p. 41, n. 12-)

(Brief of

Assuming, arguendo, that the fraud

occurred in August of 1980, certainly DeBry had an absolute right
to withdraw at that time.

If DeBry had withdrawn, he would have

clearly been entitled to a fee based upon quantum meruit.
Speiser, §4:10.)
Graystone says that DeBry waived any right to raise
fraud at a later time because DeBry continued to perform under
the contract after May of 1980.

However, DeBry has explained

that he had a duty to the court and to innocent third parties to
continue the lawsuit.

(See Affidavit of Robert J. DeBry, at R.

001540 and Exhibit 4, para. 14.)

Whether or not such conduct

constitutes a waiver is a pure fact issue which cannot be
decided on summary judgment.

Doujotos v. Leventhal, 271 Mass.

280, 171 N.E. 445, 69 ALR 1080; Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1980).
POINT NINE
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
Graystone claims damages for bad faith.

Graystone

relies upon Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 33 provides for "just damages" if the appeal is "frivolous."
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There is nothing at all frivolous about this appeal.
DeBry contends that the fee agreement provides for an alternative
fee (30% if DeBry controls the settlement negotiations and $50
per hour if Graystone controls the settlement negotiations).
DeBry's theory is supported by authority including the leading
text on attorney frees.

(See Brief of Appellant, at p. 6 and 7).

DeBry also contends that the agreement for a 30% contingent fee
is not severable.

Thereforef if the provision is invalid, the

fee should be determined by quantum meruit.
likewise supported by solid authority.

This theory is

(See Brief of Appellant,

at p. 8-)
Moreover, this lawsuit include allegations of fraud
against Graystone.

(See Brief of Appellant, at Point Six.)

Graystone doesn't deny their fraud.

Rather, Graystone tries to

avoid the issue of fraud by resorting to technicalities.

(See

Point Eight, above.)
Finally, all of Graystone's arguments on bad faith
were presented to the trial court.

The trial court being more

familiar with the proceedings, ruled against Graystone.
001739-001742.)

(R.

Thus, the standard of review on this issue is

abuse of discretion.

See Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286

(Utah 1976); Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs. of Salt Lake County,
555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).
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POINT TEN
DEBRY IS ENTITLED TO
INTEREST ON HIS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Graystone argues that DeBry should not be allowed to
collect interest on his fees.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 44-48.)

The matter of interest is really no longer an issue.
The trial court's order and judgment, dated March 25, 1988,
specifically grants $5,506.49 in interest out of a total of
$24,827.84, which the court found Graystone owed DeBry.
001858-001861; see Exhibit 5.)

(R.

The amount of interest awarded or

any amount to be later determined to have accrued was never
contested by Graystone.
Graystone argues that it tendered payment and was
refused.

Graystone argues, therefore, it no longer should be

expected to pay the interest due.
DeBry declined acceptance of the check for $24,827.84
because he did not want to prejudice his claim for additional
fees which may be found due him on appeal.

Once his concerns

were allayed by a stipulation of the parties, DeBry was willing
to accept the partial payment represented by the check on the

"Where a right to interest in conceded at trial, its
allowance cannot be complained of on appeal* Reed v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S.W. 904.
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condition that it not preclude any potential for additional
recovery-

(R. 001858-001862; see Exhibit 5-)
Graystone also argues that DeBry cannot charge interest

unless the client has so agreed in advance.

Graystone's argument

and citations on this issue are simply not on point.

The

authorities Graystone cites speak of an attorney's normal billing
practices not a fees dispute pending before the court.

The issue

at hand is not one of unpaid accounts receivable but of an
undetermined debt which only becomes certain upon judgment or
decision of the court.

(See Speiser, §18.17.)

The concern

which Graystonefs authorities address is that an unagreed
imposition of interest could be used as unfair leverage by an
attorney.

However, putting the facts in context, interest

imposed by judgment is less a bargaining weapon than is nonpayment of a fee.
In summary, Graystonefs arguments should be limited to
issues raised below.

Furthermore, whether Graystone's tender was

conditional or not is irrelevant.

Money owed DeBry by Graystone,

whether all or part, is presently unpaid and is accruing
interest.

The fund is DeBry's and any interest earned on it is
^\

rightfully his as well.

DATED this /~7 day of ^Jd^t^dZ/i^y
, 1989.
ROBiprr J . DEBR^CTASSOCIATES
Attorneys f o ^ - ^ p g i ^ a n t
By i>^^rL^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF (DeBry v. Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn.)
was mailed this / 7

day of f ^ j ^ y / ^ y ^ /

77

following:

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
CHAPMAN & CUTLER
50 South Main Street, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84144
Stephen Roth
Bruce Garner
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
M. David Eckersley
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Jeffrey Shields
50 South Main,Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

/ek
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1989, to the

EXHIBIT 1

AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
My name is Mark Woodward.

I give the following

under oath:
1.

Sometime in 1980 I did some cement patchwork

at the Graystone Pines condos.
2.

I was hired to do that work by Bill Kaiser

who I think was president.
3.

After I had finished the cement patchwork,

Mr. Kaiser asked me to give a bid for sealing around the
joints where the wall meets the floor.
4.

At Mr. Kaiser's request, I gave an inflated

bid of $78,000.

Both Mr. Kaiser and I knew that it would

not cost anywhere near $78,000 to do the work, but I gave
that inflated bid as a favor to Mr. Kaiser.
5.

It has been so long ago that I don't recall

the exact amount of my true bid, but it was probably less
than $10,000.
DATED this

//ffiday of ^ > { ^ £ ^

1986.

MARK WOODWARD
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this A ^ day of

tifcrt/'UsU

1986.
:AKY PUBLIC ~ J
residing at: ,

My Commission Expires

%-P-qp—

/ y A
%/f^A^KP

ft

EXHIBIT 2

•? r v — » ^ v or.' "'

v

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney, Pro Se
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

MAR 2 5 1988
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
STIPULATION, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT

Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NIELSON,
FLORANCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT,
and LOUISE MALLONEE, as the
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION on behalf of
the owners of all units in
Graystone Pines Condominiums,

Civil No. C83-5167

JUDGE RAYMOND UNO

Interveners and
Counterplaintiffs.
STIPULATION
1.
effect

On April 25, 1986, this court entered its order to the
that

"...

plaintiff's

recovery

on

his

claim

attorney's fees shall not exceed the sum of $18,300."

for
(Copy

attached.)

Thus, the court, as a matter of law, placed a lid

on attorney fees at $18,300; however, the court left open the
possibility that attorney fees may eventually be set at less
than $18,300.
2.

Defendant

and

counter

plaintiffs

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners Association and John Webster; Ray Nielson; Florance
Lewon; Carlos Croft; and Louise Mallonee, individually and as
the

Board

of

Managers

of

the

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association (hereafter referred to collectively as Graystone)
hereby
court's

waive

any

order

of

and

all

April

rights

21,

they may have

1986

to contend,

under

or

this

to offer

evidence, or to present argument to the effect that DeBry's
attorney fee snould be set at less than $18,300.
3.
should

DeBry
be

set

does
at

not

stipulate

$18,300

or

any

that

the

lesser

attorney's
amount.

fee

DeBry

specifically contends that the attorney's fee should be set in
excess of $18,300.
4.

DeBry and Graystone jointly stipulate that there is no

further triable issue in this case in that this court has ruled
as a matter of law that attorney fees should not be in excess
of $18,300; and by virtue cf Graystone's stipulation (No. 2,
above), there is no factual basis for an award of attorney fees
of less than $18,300.

-2-

5.

Therefore, judgment may be entered against defendant

Graysr.one Pines Homeowners Association and in plaintiff's favor
on his claim

for attorney

fees for

services

rendered

witn

respect to Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Bush, et
al., Civil No. C79-763, in the maximum amount permitted by the
court's order dated April 21, 1986, granting counterplaintiffs'
partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim for
attorney

fees,

that

maximum

$1,021.35 in unreimbursed

amount

being

$18,300,

plus

costs, for a total of $19,321.35,

together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from
July 1, 1983, until judgment is entered, said ju.;ment to bear
interest
paid.

at

the legal

This

judgment

appealed by DeBry.

rate

for

judgments

from

entry until

shall be a final judgment and may be
Graystone stipulates that they will not

appeal or cross-appeal from the judgment, except that Graystone
may cross-appeal the award of interest on the attorney fees and
costs awarded by the judgmen-

It is further st_.~lated that

DeBry will not be entitled to costs of court at this stage of
the proceedings.

However, if this case is remandec for a trial

on the merits by any appellant court, the prevailing party at
trial may seek costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) O.R.C.?.
6.

Graystonefs

claim

for

attorney

fees

incurred

in

defending against plaintiff's claim for attorney fees shall be
dismissed without prejudice, each party to bear its own costs

-3-

and attorney fees, and the parties agree that the statute of
limitations with respect to GraystoneTs claim for attorney fees
shall be tolled during the pendency of any appeal from the
court's judgment awarding plaintiff attorney fees and the claim
may be reasserted

should any appeal by plaintiff

result in

remand for further proceedings to establish DeBry's attorney
fees in the District Court.
7.
case

All other claims alleged in the counterclaim in this

have

been

counterclaim
prejudice,

fully

a d each
eacn

party

compromised
count

and

therein may

to bear

its own

settled

and

the

be dismissed

with

costs with

respect

thereto, including attorney fees.
8.

Graystone shall neither directly nor indirectly raise

or refer to the alleged malpractice; nor will graystone offer
evidence

of

malpractice

or

negligence

in

the

further

proceedings or appeal to determine DeBry's attorney fees.
DATED this

jh

/)0/)/%cA

day of

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney^, Pro Se
^—^

4

JJ&C

ROBERT UT. DEBRY

DATED this XI

day of y ^ - ( ^ / _

/

1988.

CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
Attorneys foroGraystone Pines

_ A —

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Graystone having waived its right to set a fee at less
than $18,300; and this court having determined as a matter of
law that the fee should not exceed $18f300; and the parties
having

made

further

stipulations

as

set

forth

above; now,

therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry shall recover of defendant

Graystone Pines Homeowners Association the sum of $19,321.35
plus

interest

amount

of

thereon

$5,506.49

through
for

a

the date of
total

judgment

judgment

of

in the

$24,827.84.

Interest shall accrue on said sum at the rate of 12% per annum
as provided by law.

This judgment is a final judgment.

party to bear its own costs.

Each

However, either party may seek

costs under Rule 54(d) U.R.C.P. in the event that this case is
remanded by an appellant court for a trial on the merits.
2.

Graystonefs

claim

for

attorney

fees

incurred

in

defending against DeBry1s claim for attorney fees is hereby
dismissed without prejudice, each party to bear its own costs
and attorney fees, but the statute of limitations with respect
to Graystone1s claim for attorney fees shall be tolled during
the pendency of any appeal from the court's judgment in the
preceding paragraph and may be reasserted should any appeal of
DeBry result in remand for further proceedings in this court
for the purpose of establishing DeBry's attorney fees.
-5-

3.

Graystone shall neither directly nor indirectly raise,

or refer to, the alleged malpractice; nor will Graystone offer
any

evidence

of

malpractice

or

negligence

in

the

further

proceedings or appeal to determine DeBry's attorney fees.
4.

All claims alleged in the counterclaim in this case

are hereby dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own
costs with respect thereto, including attorney fees.

DATED this

4<T

day of /f/A'/Jt'W

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

ATTES\
H. DsXOrf KINDLE

miKMJ

JUDGE RAYMOND UNO
Third District Court Judge

DeoJt>' ~t« r *

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify

that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing STIPULATION, ORDER AND JUDGMENT (DeBry v. Graystone
Pines Homeowners Assn.) was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
this £ ) Q day of (Jlu/lAlV

1988, to the following:

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
50 South Main Street, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

du^
-fi-

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This

agreement

/>? ^ / iJ^ %

is

made

this

/ j>

day

, 1988, by and between Robert

of

J. DeBry

("DeBry") on the one hand and Graystone Pines Homeowners
Association,

John

Webster,

Roy Nielson,

Florance

Lewon,

Carlos Croft and Louise Mallonee, individually anc as the
Board

of

Managers

Association

the

(herei:after

"Graystone")
successors

of

on

*i.e

Graystone

collectively

other;

Homeowners

referred

whereby

and assigns, extinguishes

Pines

to

Graystone,

as

their

any rights, cla.i-jr<: ,

actions or causes of action of any sort or kind against
Robert J. DeBry, DeBry's employees and agents, including but
nut limited to, any rights, claims, actions, or causes of
action

relating

to

or

arising

out

of

the malpractice

asserted in Graystone s counterclaim against DeBry in the
presently pending lawsuit between the parties in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
styled

Robert

J.

DeBry

v.

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association, et al. , Civil , ;>. C83-5167 ("lawsuit , .
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained
herein

and other

good

and valuable

considerations, the

parties agree as follows:
1.

DeBry agrees to pay to Graystone the sum of

$3,500 at the time this agreement is executed.
2.
executors,

Graystone

hereby

administrators,

releases

DeBry,

employees, agents

and his

and assigns

from any and all rights, claims, actions or causes of action

or

any

sort

or

kxnd,

whether

Known

or

unkwow.

^

% c

*

Graystone may have against DeBry including, but not limited
to,

DeBry's

dismissal

of

the

"Black Substance" claim and

Graystone's

resulting

allegations

of

malpractice

against

DeBry, including any rights, claims, actions or causes of
action

of

any

sort

or

kind

asserted

in

Graystone's

counterclaim in the lawsuit.
3.

It

is

agreed

by

Graystone

that

the

consideration paid to it has been paid to compromise and
settle disputed claims and that nothing contained herein
shall be construed as an admission of liability on the part
of DeBry and that DeBry makes no admission that he has in
any manner whatever been indebted to Graystone.
4.

The parties

agree that

the terms

of this

settlement agreement shall be kept confidential and shall
not be disclosed without the consent of the parties hereto,
except that DeBry may disclose the terms of settlement to
his insurance carriers and office staff and Graystone may
disclose the terms of settlement to the individual members
of the Homeowners Association for purposes of obtaining a
resolution
agreement.

authorizing
The

the

parties

execution

recognize

of

that

this

settlement

because

of

tve

relatively large number of people, including more than 32
homeowners, to whom the terms of this settlement agreement
must be disclosed, the terms of the settlement agreement may
be

inadvertently

or

innocently

intention of causing harm to DeBry.

disclosed

without

any

Therefore, the parties

agree

that

a disclosure

of

the

terms of

this

settlement

agreement, made without the conscious intent and purpose of
causing injury to DeBry or his reputation, shall not be an
actionable breach of the terms of this agreement.

However,

Graystone specifically agrees that it will advise the said
homeowners of the confidentiality of this Agreement.
5.

In releasing its claims arising from DeBry's

dismissal of the "Black Substance" claim and the resulting
claims of malpractice asserted against DeBry in Graystone's
counterclaim in the lawsuit, Graystone agrees that it shall
neither

directly

nor

indirectly

raise

or

refer

to

the

alleged negligence or malpractice; nor will Graystone offer
any evidence of or relating to the alleged negligence or
malpractice in the litigation or appeal of DeBry's pending
claim for attorney fees in the lawsuit.
6.

DeBry's

lawsuit is reserved.

claim

for

attorney

fees

in

the

Specifically, DeBry reserves his right

to appeal the trial court's determination setting attorney
fees at $18,300 plus unreimbursed cosrs and interest and to
thereby seek a higher award of attorney fees.
7.

Graystone

waives

it

pending

claim

for

attorney fees against DeBry unless and until this case is
remanded by any appellate court
Graystone
claim

for

specifically
attorney

reserves

fees

against

for further proceedings.
its

right to reassert a>

DeBry

if this

case

is

remanded by any appellate court to determine the amount of
DeBry's fee.

8.

Every

person

signing

this

agi -reraent

represents, warrants and acknowledges that he has read and
understood it, that such signature is his free and voluntary
act, and that he has full authority; and authorization to
bind those for whom and in behalf of which he has affixed
his signature.
WHEREAS,

IN

WITNESS

HEREOF, the parties by their

HERETO

AND

IN

AGREEMENT

authorized representatives,

have affixed their signatures hereunto as indicated below.
/

ROBERT J. DEBRY
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, BY:
'-JOHN WEBSTER, individually and
as a member of the Board of
Managers of Graystone Pines
Homeowners Association
ROY NIELSON, individually and
as a member of the Board of
Managers of Graystone Pines
^Homeowners Association
FLORANCE LEWON,] individually
and as a member of the Board
of Managers of Graystone PineHomeowners Association
7

l

v Si*-±/ms

^^r"

CARLOS CROFT, indiyidually and
as'"a member of the Board of
Managers of Graystone Pines
Homeowners Association

-' ''?/,';£/-

•

- -v-fv

LOUISE MALLONEE, individually
and as a member of the Board
of Managers of Graystone Pines
Homeowners Association

AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
My name is Mark Woodward.

I give the following

under oath:
1.

Sometime in 1980 I did some cement patchwork

at the Graystone Pines condos.
2.

I was hired to do that work by Bill Kaiser

who I think was president.
3.

After I had finished the cement patchwork,

Mr. Kaiser asked me to give a bid for sealing around the
joints where the wall meets the floor.
4.

At Mr. Kaiser's request, I gave an inflated

bid of $78,000.

Both Mr. Kaiser and I knew that it would

not cost anywhere near $78,000 to do the work, but I gave
that inflated bid as a favor to Mr. Kaiser.
5.

It has been so long ago that I don't recall

the exact amount of my true bid, but it was probably less
than $10,000.
DATED this

//ffiday of ^ 4 ^ ^

1986

MARK WOODWARD
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this AL^ day of
^

d/y/^OU

1986.

/IM^S

My Commission Expires:
CJ

r,

^ /Q ^

PUBLIC ~^/ ^ / y j
/ ^esidir
iding at; t %//J&£?

/f'j

f <£~
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business. This Is the fair meaning of the f payment of the proceeds into court to Mrw«w
direction to pay or place 4for the account of • to the lien of plaintiff's attorneys," without**,
Garbrecht & Co.* If, in fact, Garbrecht & limitation on the amount to stand as ucurir*
^;
Co. had made no arrangements with Luer> for such services.
man & Son to place the money to their
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dfc
credit with defendants, and had not author- vol. 5, Attorney and Client, $ 400.]
^
ized it to be done, then the plaintiffs pal<L 2. SA^OE—CONTBACT BETWEEN ATTOBSET AJH>
9
CLIENT—PBOVISION AGAINST SETTUQCENT. -5
over the money under a mistake. * Assumprovision in a contract between attorney
ing for the argument only that the learnea and A
client for a contingent fee, that the dienc
judge is correct in his statement of what should not make a bona fide settlement without
presumption would arise from the cablegram, the attorney's consent, was contrary to public
and invalid.
r#
the plaintiffs had no possible Interest in what policy
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point see Cent Dit
Garbrecht & Co. might do with the money. voL 5, Attorney and Client, § 407.]
f%
If the credit was given exclusively to Luer> 3. SAME — CONTINGENT FEE — SETTLEMENT-1
QUANTUM
MEBUIT.
man, then all that the plaintiffs were required
A contract for attorney's services provide*
to do was to comply with Lnerman's dlrets for payment
of a percentage of any recovery;
tions. It mattered nothing to them whether and prohibited a settlement without the attorGarbrecht or any one else had ordered the ney's consent Held that though the prorisio*
restraining settlement was invalid, it was m
payment of this money, so long as the credit connected
with the clause fixing the compensaor responsibility of the person alleged to have tion that neither
could be sustained, so that the
ordered the payment was not pledged. It client having settled the litigation without the
consent
of
the
attorneys,
they were not bound
is said by another learned judge: "It Is
to accept the • percentage of the settlement in
proven that Garbrecht disclaimed and dis- satisfaction
for their services, but could reco^
avowed the relation imputed to him to the er the reasonable value thereof.
transaction, and did not authorize the pay. [Ed. Note.—For cases in point see Cent Dig,
ment to be made on his account and would vol 5, Attorney and Client, i 353.]
not adopt i t The plaintiffs were misled by
Edward T. Bartlett, J„ dissenting.
~
Lnerman's cable message and paid the money
Appeal from Supreme Court Appellate Dito the defendants through mistake." Herfe,
^
again, we are brought to the question a), vision, First Department
Action by Henry B. Snyder against the De
ready discussed. If the cablegram purported to pledge Garbrechfs credit, undoubted- Forest Wireless Telegraph Company and othly he could repudiate the transaction as un- ers, In which plaintiff Snyder applied for
authorized by him. But, if it did not purport payment out of court of moneys deposited to
to impose any liability on Garbrecht, there the credit of the action, to which James A.
was nothing in the transaction for him to r^» Allen and Roger Foster, his attorneys in the
pudiate. The money paid was not his, and original action, objected. From an order of
the claim on which it was paid also was not the Appellate Division, objectors appeal Rehis, but his principal's. Therefore, in what- versed, and judgment of Special Term afever aspect we view the case, its determine, firmed.
tion (at this stage) turns on the single propoSee 99 N. Y. Supp. 644, 113 App. Div. 840.
sition that the plaintiffs in paying the deThis is an appeal from an order reversing
fendants relied solely on the responsibility an order of the Special Term which appointof Luerman, and neither in fact nor in their ed a referee to determine the value of legal
belief extended any credit to Garbrecht services performed by the appellants in order
Hence there was no mistake as to any ma- that the amount of their lien upon certain
terial fact
moneys paid into court might be determined.
The judgment should be reversed, and ne\r Said order appealed from also permitted the
trial granted, costs to abide the event
respondent Snyder, who was the client of
said appellants, to withdraw from court a
GBAX O'BBIBN, yjUSN, WEBXEB, T50X- certain amount of the moneys held therein,
LARD BARTLETT, and CHASE, JX, concur
Roger Foster, for appellants. George P.
Breckenridge, for respondent
Judgment reversed, etc
HISCOCK, J. The appellants, who are
practicing attorneys, made a written agree(190 N. T. 66.)
ment with the respondent for the prosecuIn re SNYDER.
tion by them in his behalf of litigation
SNYDER v. DE FOREST WIRELESS
against various parties under a plan of
contingent compensation. Said agreement
TELEGRAPH CO. et al
(Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 19,1907.) amongst other things, originally provided
1. ATTOROTEX jura CLIENT — LIEN FOB SERV- that the attorneys should receive for their
ICES—MONET PAID INTO COUBT.
services one-third of the proceeds of said
Where money was paid into court on a set- litigation or the proceeds of the sale of certlement between the parties, without the con,, tain stock, and nothing else; also, that neisent of plaintiffs attorneys, who had a contract
for a contingent fee, the attorneys had a lien ther party to the agreement should "settle
on the entire fund so deposited, both under th.e any of said litigations without the consent
express provisions of Code Civ. Proa $ 66, and of each of the other parties." Subsequently
under the order for settlement which directed

,\. Y.)

IN RE SNYDER.

tiiis agreement was modified so as to provide
tli.it the compensation should be one-half
ln-tead of one-third. Various actions and
proceedings were Instituted under this retainer, and, as is claimed by the appellants,
services of much value were rendered to the
client After a time Snyder entered into
negotiations with the parties whom he was
prosecuting for a settlement of the litigation,
and not only without the consent of his attorneys, but in spite of their protest made an
agreement for such settlement for the sum of
$7,500. Still later a motion was made by the
party with whom Snyder had made his
agreement for an order settling and discontinuing the litigation for the sum agreed upon, and to which motion both Snyder and the
appellants were made parties. Notwithstanding the opposition of the latter, and
after the consideration of quite voluminous
affidavits presented' by the attorneys and the
client, respectively, in opposition to and in
support of the settlement, an order was made
granting the motion upon payment into court
of the sum of $7,500 **to respond to the Hen
of the plaintiffs attorneys." Some time later, a motion having been made by the client
to withdraw one-half of this sum In accordance with the terms of the agreement between him and his attorneys, the court directed a reference to ascertain the value of
the services which the attorneys had rendered in order that the amount of their
claims and lien upon the .fund might be determined before Snyder withdrew any money. This was done upon the theory that
Snyder, by making a settlement in violation
of the wishes of his attorneys, had so broken his contract that the latter were no longer limited to the terms of their agreement
tor their compensation, but were entitled to
recover from the fund for the value of their
services on the basis of quantum meruit
As already indicated, the Appellate Division
took the view that this order was improper,
holding that the attorneys were limited so
far as their lien upon the fund in court was
concerned to the compensation fixed by the
original agreement and relegated for any
further relief to an action against their
client for breach of contract We think that
the disposition made by the learned justice
at Special Term was correct, and that It was
error to reverse the order then made and
substitute the one from which this appeal is
now taken.
Some propositions involved in the appeal
seem quite clear. The attorneys had a lien
npon the moneys paid into court for the
amount or value of their services, whatever
it might be. This was secured to them by
section 66 of the Code, and, in addition, the
order allowing the settlement of the litigation and directing the payment of the proceeds into court expressly provided that the
latter should "respond to the lien of the
Plaintiff's attorneys" without any limitation
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should be allowed. If the clause prohibiting
a settlement without the consent of the attorneys is valid, the client has prevented
them from carrying out their contract, and
they are entitled to treat it as terminated
And recover the actual value of services rendered before the breach without reference to
the terms of the original contract If the
clause prohibiting the settlement without the
consent of the attorneys Is void as against
public policy, so that it may be repudiated
by the client, but yet is so connected with
the clause prescribing the percentage of recovery which the attorneys were to receive
as compensation that the latter clause falls
with it, then, again, the attorneys must be
entitled to recover the value of the services
rendered by them upon the basis of actual
worth. While the adoption of either view,
therefore, would render necessary an appraisal of the value of appellants' services,
it is proper to determine which one shall
prevail, assuming that the latter one is permissible, and In this determination the first
and fundamental question will be as to the
validity of the clause prohibiting a settlement
It has been decided so often and so fully
that attorneys may undertake litigation for a
compensation contingent upon their successful efforts that It is unnecessary to refer to
the decisions upon that point But this
court, so far as I am aware, has never yet
decided the naked proposition now urged upon us that an attorney, in furtherance of his
contract for a contingent compensation, may
reserve a veto power upon the right of his
client to make in good faith an honest settlement of his claim, and I think it would be
unwise and opposed to sound public policy
to so decide now. In the first place, a decision upholding such a contract would confer
upon one person occupying a position of trust
toward another unusual power over the latter in the control and management of his
own property, for we must not forget that
the attorney has only a lien upon the client's
cause of action which still remains the property of the latter. It is not too much to assume that such power would at times be the
source of abuse as between the two parties.
But more Important than any such personal
and private considerations Is the one of public concern that such contracts would prove
added obstacles to that quieting of disputes,
and to that adjustment and settlement of
litigation which always has been and always should be favored by the acts of Legislatures, the decisions of courts, and the expressions of public opinion; for, in my judgment, there is no need of long argument to
demonstrate that such contracts would prove
such obstacles. We have before us in this
very litigation an illustration of the manner
in which they would be utilized If so permitted to prevent settlements even when the
attorney and client were involved In no other
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about the amount which onght to be realized 1 is pertinent to the general subject now beings
4
from the litigation. And, if this result would discussed. In its behalf Judge Ruger wrote "
have happened where reputable attorneys as follows: "We are of the opinion that th*-<
were prosecuting what we are entitled to as- existence of such a lien in favor of the attor-*
sume was legitimate litigation with due re- ueys does not confer a right on them to standi
gard for the rights of their client, it requires in the way of a settlement of an action which *
no long vision to see how frequently the is desired by the parties, and which does not'
power would be used by reckless or unscru- prejudice any right of the attorneys. We doj
pulous attorneys to prolong litigation for the not think that such an agreement deprives a.,
sole purpose of forcing a defendant or client party of the right to control the management/
or both to pay additional tribute in order to of his own cause, and to determine when thesecure that settlement and peace which they litlgation shall cease and how far it shall be
extended. The client still remains the lawdesired, and public policy commended.
It is urged that this power is necessary for ful owner of the cause of action, and is not
the protection of attorneys. Courts are not bound to continue the litigation for the bene-*
unmindful of the fact that the system of con- fit of his attorneys when he judges it prutingent compensation has the merit of afford- dent to stop, provided he is willing and ablev
ing to certain classes of persons the oppor- to satisfy his attorneys' Just claims. In fact,*
tunity to procure that prosecution of their the lien under the agreement was Intended
claims 'which otherwise would be beyond their for and operates only as a security for themeans, and that the attorney should be pro- attorneys' legal claims, and, unless those are
tected from any dishonest attempt to deprive prejudiced by the client's contract, she has
him of his compensation. On the other hand, unrestricted control of the subject of the acno one having had an opportunity for obser- tion, and the terms upon which a settlement
vation can well close his eyes to the fact j shall be effected." Flscber-Han3en v. Brookthat thfs same system many times promotes | lyn Heights R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N.
litigation which is so unjustifiable that it ! B. 395, was an action brought to enforce the
. does not even rise to the level of being specu- lien of the plaintiff upon a judgment which
lative, and which, being carried forward by j he had recovered for a client against the deunlawful and forbidden methods, leads some- fendant, and which judgment the latter, afttimes to the enforcement of unjust recoveries er notice of the attorney's lien, had secretly
from unfortunate defendants, sometimes to settled with the client, who was financially
the exaction of unconscionable compensation irresponsible. In writing in that case in befrom ignorant or helpless clients, and always half of a unanimous court, Judge Vann laid
to stirring up discord and lawsuits. In view down principles which certainly guide us
of the relief which courts render against set- in the direction of the conclusions already
tlements made with the dishonest purpose stated. Referring to the Hen given by the
of cheating attorneys of their Just compensa- Code to the attorney upon his ftienf s cause
tion, it does not often happen that a reputa- of action, he wrote as follows: "The statute
ble attorney undertaking legitimate litigation says that the lien (given by the statute) canfor a contingent compensation is deprived of not be affected by any settlement between the
his just dues, and there seems to be no sub- parties before or after judgment; but does
stantial necessity for approving a form of it mean that no settlement whatever can be
contract which would enable unworthy mem- made without the consent of the attorney?
bers of the profession to increase existing It clearly means this, unless the lien is imevils through a power to manipulate and nul- pliedly transferred to the proceeds of the setlify any disposition upon the part of their tlement. But did the Legislature, in its efclients to settle their differences. While, as fort to protect attorneys, intend to sacrifice
stated, the courts of our own state do not the client by preventing him from making an
appear to have passed upon this precise ques- honest settlement of his own cause of action?
tion, whatever has been said upon this gen- Did it intend to overturn the ancient and
eral subject of the right of a client, to settle honored rule of law that settlements are to be
litigation without interference by his attor- encouraged by giving the attorney power to
ney confirms the view now being presented. insist that the litigation must continue until
In Lee v. Vacuum Oil Co., 126 N. Y. 579, he consents that it should stop? Did it in27 N. Id 1018, the attorneys for the plaintiff tend to so tie the hands of the client that he
had an agreement for a contingent compensa- could not settle his own controversy without
tion with a clause providing that no settle- the permission of his attorney? A cause of
ment should be made without their consent action is not the property or the attorney,
After recovery of judgment, a settlement was bnt of the client The attorney owns no part
made without the consent of the attorneys, of it, for a lien does not give a right to propand subsequently a motion was made on be- erty, but a charge upon i t As it Is merely
half of them and of the client herself to va- incidental, and for the purpose of security
cate the settlement upon the ground of fraud. only, it would not be reasonable to hold that
The question presented, therefore, arose be- the Legislature Intended it should be the
tween the attorneys and the opposite party and means of blocking an honest and genuine adupon facts somewhat different from those justment of controversies. We think the lien
before us. Still what was said by the court is subject to the right of the client to settle

$. T.)
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In good faith, without regard to the wish of
tie attorney, and we so held in the Peri Case,
152 X. Y. 521, 46 ,N. B. 849, where we declared that *the existence of the lien does not
permit the plaintiff's attorney to stand in
tie vray of Jt settlement' • • • The Legislature did not Intend to make the lien the
chief thing, nor to compel the client to abdicate hi9 position as principal in favor of the
azeat or attorney whom he employed in order to secure his rights. It did not Intend to
prevent him from dealing with his own property as he saw fit, provided he exercised his
honest Judgment, and took no advantage of his
attorney." In other states an abundance of authority is to be found for the doctrine that a
clause prohibiting the client from making a settlement of Ms litigation without the consent of
his attorney is void as against public policy.
Huber v. Johnson (Supreme Court of Minnesota) 68 Minn. 74, 70 N.'W. 806, 64 Am. St
Rep. 456; North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ackley, 17111L 100, 49 N. E. 222, 44 L. R. A. 177;
Lewis v. Lewis* 15 Ohio, 715, 716; Key v.
Vattier, 1 Ohio, 132; Davis v. Webber, 66
Ark. 190, 49 S. W. 822, 45 L. R. A. 196, 74
Am. St Rep. 81.. These views lead to the
conclusion that appellants are not entitled to
recover from their client upon the quantum
meruit upon the ground that the clause prohibiting a settlement was legal, and, therefore, his acts in disregard thereof a breach of
contract.
But I do think that they may still recover
upon that basis upon the other theory suggested. The clause in the contract fixing the
value of the services at a certain percentage
of the recovery was connected with the provision that the attorneys should have a
voice in any settlement and in determining
the amount of any recovery by that process. The two clauses were manifestly part
of a single plan. Therefore, when the client takes advantage of the invalidity of
one clause and repudiates it, tne other one
cahhot stand .aloiitf, Qui must fall iflth ft,
aha the result or this again is to permit
the attorneys to recover for the services
which they have actually rendered accord^
tnft +* »frpir rofli value and independent of
the original provision in tne contracTUgon
this subject Davis v. Weboer, supra; uammons v. Johnson, 69 Minn. 483, Tl JSL W. 663;
Signww v. h'elgtf, 2X WIsTolgr"
The order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs.
EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J. (dissenting).
I agree with my Brother HISCOCK that toe
appellants, the attorneys, are entitled to some
form of relief in this proceeding. I am, however, unable to agree with the conclusion
reached by him that an agreement between
an attorney and client, creating a lien upon
the cause of action, cannot lawfully contain
the provision that neither party shall settle
the litigation without the consent of the

^ ^

other. If it be the fact that this court has
never passed upon the validity of such a
clause in a contract, I am of opinion that it
is valid. I see no reason why counsel entering upon a long and difficult litigation for an
impecunious client should not protect himself
against a premature and ill-advised settlement of the litigation by the client These
contracts are under the strict supervision
and scrutiny of the court, and I am unable
to see anything in contravention of public
policy when this clause appears to have been
entered Into in good faith by both parties.
In the absence of such a clause, it has been
frequently held in this state and elsewhere
that the client may negotiate an honest and
reasonable settlement at any time. There is
no reason in my judgment why this right
cannot be waived.
The Special Term held that the attorneys
had a lien upon the $7,500 paid into court on
the settlement, and that, the original contract
having been abandoned by the action of the
clients, it was competent for the attorneys
to go before a referee and prove the reasonable value of their services. If the services,
however, were proved to exceed in value the
?7,500 paid into court, the clients would in
my opinion be liable for the excess in an action by the attorneys to recover damages for
a breach of the contract
The order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the order of the Special
Term modified, so as to provide that, if the
attorneys prove their services to be in value
exceeding the sum of $7,500 paid into court,
they may bring an action against the clients
to recover this balance as damages for a
breach of the original contract, and as so
modified affirmed, with costs and disbursements in the Appellate Division and in this
court
CULLEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, HAIGHT,
VANN, and CHASE, JJ., concur with HISCOCK, J. EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J.,
reads dissenting opinion.
Ordered accordingly.
(ISO N. T. 4L)

WOOLVERTON v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK.
(Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 19, 1907.)
INSURANCE — EMPLOYES*S LIABILITY INSURANCE—DUTY TO REPORT ACCIDENTS—NEGLECT OF SERVANT.

Under the provision of a policy indemnifying one against liability for injuries to others
from its teams, that assured, on the occurrence
of an accident and also on receiving information of a claim on account of an accident, shall
give immediate notice of the accident or claim
to the insurer, insured is not excused from giving notice of an accident merely because none
of its general officers or directors or any one
who had the duty of adjusting: differences between it and the insurer had knowledge thereof; but, while the knowledge of the driver who
caused the accident is not imputable to insured,
yet, if he reported it to one whose duty it was
in the ordinary and natural conduct of the busi-
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EXHIBIT 4

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Carmen Kipp
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
3 2 Exchange Place, #6 00
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 561-3773
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
vs,
GRAYSTONE PINE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH;
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN JENSEN;
the partnership of SNOW,
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,
and JOHN WEBSTER; and
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
Defendants,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J.
DEBRY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER
GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
GRAYSTONE AND TO ENTER
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEBRY

HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO

vs.
30KH WBSTOR, ROY NEI^SOtt,
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT,
and LOUISE MALLONEE as the
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION on behalf of the
owners of all units in the
Graystone Pines Condominiums,
Intervenors and
Counterplaintiffs.

Civil No. C83-5167

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

My name is Robert J. DeBry.

I give the following

testimony under oath:
1.

In the underlying case between Graystone Pines

Homeowners Association

(hereafter Homeowners) and Graystone

Pines, Inc., I was employed, in part, to litigate a structural
defect known as the "black substance" claim.
2.

In order to save money in the preparation of the

case, I instructed the Homeowners to work directly with architects and engineers to determine the extent of the damages.
3.

The information from architects and engineers

was relayed to me, in part, by Mr. Bill Kaiser.

Mr. Kaiser was

for a portion of the litigation the president of the Homeowners.

After his term as president, he remained on an ad hoc

committee of the homeowners which was charged with directing
the lawsuit.
4.

In particular, I was told that Mr. Kaiser would

obtain firm bids for repairing the "black substance" problem.
My intent was to present live testimony as to the cost of
repairing the "black substance" problem at trial.
5.

Mr. Kaiser continually told me that the cost of

repairing the black substance problem would be $78,000.

I told

Mr. Kaiser that I needed a written bid, and he subsequently
provided me with a written bid.

(Exhibit A.)

6.

I relied on the representations that the true

cost of repairing the "black substance" problem would be
$78,000.

I therefore relayed that figure to opposing counsel

in response to discovery requests.

I also planned for expert

testimony an did legal research commensurate with the $78,000
issue.
7.

In the last few days prior to trial, I insisted

that I meet with the contractor in order to review his testimony.

At that time I met with one Mark Woodward.

In reviewing

the $7 8,0 00 bid with Mr. Woodward, it was immediately apparent
that the $78,000 had no relationship at all to reality.

It was

further apparent that Mr. Woodward's testimony would not stand
up in Court.
8.

I asked Mr. Woodward why he had prepared such an

unrealistic bid.

He replied to me that Mr. Kaiser had request-

ed an inflated bid to use as bargaining pressure and to intimidate the opposition.

He said that he had fabricated the bid at

the request of Mr. Kaiser.
9.

I therefore obtained my own expert who calculat-

ed the true cost to repair the "black substance" problem.

The

new expert computed the cost of repair to be approximately
$9,000.

That $9,000 bid included only the common areas, but

since common areas were regarded as "party walls," most of the
repairs fell within that $9,000 bid.
10.

My original contract with Graystone was for $50

per hour (Exhibit B).

Thereafter, Graystone asked me to change

to a contingent fee basis,

I was greatly opposed to that

proposal; however, as an accommodation, I did agree to the
change over (Exhibit C ) •
11.

I do not recall whether the $78,000 figure was

given to me before or after the changeover to a contingent fee
(Exhibit C ) . However, I had been assured by Mr. Kaiser from
the very beginning of the relationship (and well before Exhibit
C) that the expenses for repairing the "black substance" issue
would be very substantial.
12.

If I had known the true facts at any time prior

to Exhibit C, I would never have agreed to the changeover.
13.

If I had known the true facts shortly after

Exhibit C, I would have felt justified to renegotiate the
contract, or to withdraw altogether.

I would also have had the

option of reducing the legal work and expert fees involved in
the "black substance" issue.

I certainly would never have

invested such a monumental amount of time for the chance of a
contingent fee on $9,000.
14.

As I have testified above, I did not learn the

true facts until I met with Mr. Woodward shortly before trial.
At that late date, I felt that I had no alternative but to
press ahead with the trial date.

Moreover, I felt that there

were many innocent homeowners who were not part of the fraud.
I felt that they had a right to their day in Court.

And

finally, we had already, at that point, issued subpoenas and
paid for expert witnesses and prepared expensive exhibits.

It

was obvious that a delay in the trial, at that point, would
have been enormously expensive.

Furthermore, even if the judge

allowed a continuance, he would have probably allowed costs to
the defendants.
without

great

Thus, I could not have withdrawn at that point
expense

to

my

clients

and

substantial

inconvenience to innocent parties.
DATED this

^ 3 l day of

l Ljd-

1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

WJr

,^?3

day

1986.

NOTARY/ PUBLIC

Residing at;V Jqjj-.JaMs

(IMOTLL,

* .<

ftPl^---""

EXHIBIT 5

f
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney, Pro Se
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

3/

JL^yM0//.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
STIPULATION, MOTION AND
ORDER AMENDING JUNE 11,
1986, ORDER

vs.
GRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NIELSON,
FLORANCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT,
and LOUISE MALLONEE, as the
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION on behalf of )
the owners of all units in
Graystone Pines Condominiums,

Civil No. C83-5167

JUDGE RAYMOND UNO

Intervenors and
Counterplaintiffs.

STIPULATION AND HOTTON
Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry and defendant Graystone
Pines Homeowners Association

and

intervenors

hereby agree

r\n-" crr.ji

that the court's prior order requiring that Graystone Pines
Homeowners Association retain a minimum balance of $48,000 in
Account Number 5200-40668 with Commercial Security Bank (now
"Key Bank"), Sugarhouse Branch, be amended to permit Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association

to

pay

the

sum

of

$24,827.84 to Robert J. DeBry.
It is further stipulated that plaintiff Robert J.
DeBry

may

waiving

negotiate

his claims

and

receive

(including

the

$24,827.84

without

a pending appeal) that the

judgment of 25 March 1988 is too low and that Robert J. DeBry
is entitled to attorney

fees

(and interest) in excess of

$24,827.84.
Plaintiff and defendant and the interveners move
the court to enter the following order.
DATED this 2&~ day of

jA^Cjj^c^

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys Pro Se

By

/ Lfr<sU

S-'

ROBERT J. DEBRY
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
Attorneys for Graystone Pines

DINER, JR.

ORDER
Upon

the

foregoing

Stipulation

and

good

cause

appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court's June 11,
19 86, Order denying plaintiff's motion to certify under Rule
54(d) and requiring the Graystone Pines Homeowners Association to retain a minimum balance of $48,000 in Account Number
5200-40668 with Commercial Security Bank (now "Key Bank"),
Sugarhouse

Branch,

pending

disposition

of

this

case, is

hereby modified as follows:
1.

Graystone Pines Homeowners Association shall

withdraw $24,827.84 and pay that amount to plaintiff pursuant
to the court's Order of March 25, 1988; and the bank is
authorized to permit the withdrawal of funds in that amount;
2.

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association

is

hereafter required to retain in Account Number 5200-40668
with defendant Commercial Security Bank

(now "Key Bank"),

Sugarhouse Branch only a minimum balance of $23,172.16, which
is the $48,000 reduced by the $24,827.84 paid to Robert J.
DeBry as described above.
3-

The court's June 11, 1986, Order, except as

modified hereby continues in effect.

3

4.
negotiate

the

Plaintiff
said

Robert

$24,827.84

J.

DeBry

may

receive

without waiving

and

his claims

(including a pending appeal) that the judgment of March 25,
1988 is too low and that Robert J. DeBry is entitled to
attorney fees (and interest) in excess of $24,827,84.
DATED this / ^

day of

A-//^/

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
District Court Judge

ATTEST
M. DI*ON HiKDLZfr
By

4

—

V/7////
Do^Jtc Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER AMENDING JUNE 11,
1986, ORDER (DeBry v. Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn.) was
mailed,

U.S.

f^YlCLu

Mail,

postage

prepaid,

, 1988, to the following:

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
CHAPMAN & CUTLER
50 South Main Street, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84144
Stephen Roth
Bruche Garner
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
M. David Eckersley
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

INER & BROWN
Suite 400
I
ah

84110

Jeffrey Shields
50 South Main,Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

this

rQ.j

day

of

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
CHAPMAN & CUTLER
50 South Main Street, Eighth
Salt Lake City, UT
84144
M. David Eckersley
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT

84111

Jeffrey Shields
50 South Main,Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

r.

Stephen Roth
Bruce Garner
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place,
Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

